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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will deal with the relationship be¬ 
tween the huge American steel industry and the public in¬ 
terest, in an exploration of past problems designed to 
shed light on the problems of the present. 
In April of 1962 the importance of the steel 
industry in the economy of this nation was once again 
brought to the attention of the public, when an increase 
in steel prices precipitated Presidential action in an 
attempt to force the companies to rescind the increases. 
The price increases had followed a labor settlement 
which was reported to have cost eleven cents per employee 
hour, a relatively small settlement for the industry. 
Prices had not risen in several years, and evidently the 
officials in the companies felt it was time for an increase, 
though the President obviously did not. 
Although the 1962 incident is the focal point for 
this investigation, it is the characteristics of the in¬ 
dustry which become the central problem in the relationship 
-2- 
of steel to the public interest. This thesis is an attempt 
to set forth for readers some of the basic problems 
existing today. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
It is usual to think of the public interest as com¬ 
posed of the collective interests of all those citizens who 
can be called the public. It is useful, however, to think 
in terms of the interests of several major sectors vfoich 
collectively compose the public interest. This paper will 
recognize three sectors in addition to the general public: 
business, government, and labor. This socio-political view 
seems to the author to represent realistically the existing 
situation in this country. 
The general public encompasses the many individuals 
in the country, and obviously this is the broadest group of 
the four, including members of the other groups in its clas¬ 
sification. The other three groups are meant to convey the 
concept of self-interest, as well as responsibility for the 
interests of other groups. For example, the Federal Govern¬ 
ment has a responsibility to represent the general public, 
to hear the many lobbies of labor and business, while at 
the same time the Government is itself an interest, and is 
-3- 
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in a position to maintain its interest. 
These major classifications encompass many smaller 
groups, i.e business could be classified by industry, by 
type of organization, or by region, to name a few possi¬ 
bilities. One can begin to think about these four groups in 
these terms for some time before a lost sense of futility 
or exhaustion sets in. But these are the terms of the con¬ 
cept called the public interest. 
This brings us to recognize the interplay of forces 
in society, where everyone has a multitude of interests. A 
single individual may belong to many interest groups, from 
country, state, county, city, down to church, business in- 
% 
dustry and firm, or labor group, and on to small interest 
groups such as local parent-teacher groups, or other lodge 
type activities. The many interests of the many people who 
compose the public make it almost impossible to determine 
the state of the public interest at any one time. 
In terms of the steel community, it is easily seen 
that the interest of the largest ten producers may in itself 
be diverse, and when one thinks of the total public in¬ 
terest, the steel companies play a part which is small in 
terms of individual entities in the country that has 
an interest. But In economic terms the interest of these 
-5- 
companies is major, for analysis of the economy indicates 
that steel plays a very large part in the price levels, 
which have been moving upward for some years. 
Kaplan points out that the 361 largest business 
corporations in this country account for approximately 70 
billion dollars of total assets, which is comparable to 
1 
the 70 billion held by 3.6 million small enterprises. This 
points to the power of the large corporation in our society, 
and perhaps provides insight into the large amounts of regu¬ 
lation and surveillance Americans behold. 
The public interest is an abstract representation of 
concrete activities and interplays in the total American 
system, and must be defined in terms of values on a philo¬ 
sophic basis. It is composed of considerations which are 
social, philosophical, political, religious, economic, moral, 
ethical, legal, and psychological. In other words, it is 
complicated not only by the multitude of facets it en¬ 
compasses, but also by the many groups and forces it molds. 
The public interest is a fluid phenomenon which adapts to 
A. D. H. Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a Competitive 
System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1954), 
pp. 116-118. 
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changing circumstances on one hand, and changes circum¬ 
stances to adjust them to its requirements on the other 
hand. It is not only that in which the public is in¬ 
terested, but also what is best for the total American 
system, for the public will be interested in the many 
small individual matters which confront it, as well as 
national and international matters. 
In the representative system which we have in this 
country, politics enters into the considerations government 
members must constantly appraise. There are many favors 
and accommodations which are involved, and these must be 
considered when discussing the actions taken by government 
members in terms of implementing the public interest. Hence 
we find that in many cases these people must make judgments 
regarding what they believe to be the public interest in 
fact. This obviously is difficult, given a certain degree 
of human frailty, and the finiteness of the human mind. The 
people have entrusted a good part of the responsibility for 
guarding the public interest in these people, in all facets 
of government. 
However, because the enormity of the public interest 
is overwhelming, responsibility rests equally on the shoulders 
of all individuals-and groups in the country. When this 
-7- 
responsibility is scorned or simply overlooked, the govern¬ 
ment must make a judgment regarding appropriate actions to 
be taken. In the case of the steel controversy of April, 
1962, the judgment was that the steel community had a large 
responsibility which was scorned, and the government took 
measures to bring the industry to consider that responsi¬ 
bility. This is obviously a qualitative judgment, for there 
are not always rules to follow in such unusual circumstances. 
Each situation is different, and one can only think in terms 
of his own view of totality, and in terms of the objectives 
toward which society is working, not only in the present, 
but also in the future. 
There can be little doubt that the government has made 
mistakes in the past. But this does not mean that the 
problems will disappear; the decisions must be made, and in 
1962 the President, elected by the nation to oversee the 
matters for which he has responsibility, chose to pressure 
the steel community for a rescission of price increases. 
There were many problems involved, including the legal 
aspects which stemmed from the hint of illegal collusion on 
the part of the companies, due to the rapid manner in which 
all the prices were raised. 
National policy in connection with the public interest 
-8- 
can not be made by any one branch of the government entirely, 
but decisive action in short time demanded executive 
determination in defense of a judgment. There seemed to 
be political implications involved in the controversy, 
stemming from the long term relationship between steel, labor, 
2 
and government. 
The public interest is concerned with optimization 
of the results of forces involved in the dynamic interplay 
of society, and is represented by such terms as good, right, 
justice, equality, or equity. The concept of the public 
interest is not precisely stated here, because it is not a 
precise phenomenon. But it does involve the use of forces 
to mold the interests of the parts into seme equitable re¬ 
lationship within the whole, which is composed of the parts, 
and the multitude of relationships existing among the parts. 
The public interest, at the time of the crisis and 
thereafter, was affected in several ways. Certainly the 
See The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times 
for the period between April 10 and 30, 1962, for many 
articles on the controversy. Other articles on the details 
leading up to the controversy and those ensuing from it are 
available in the news media, and will not be repeated here. 
One source on the events connected with the controversy is 
Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co.r 1963). 
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price increases gave the companies a psychological lift. 
Perhaps more important was the psychological effect on the 
general public; inflation fear caused a good deal of concern 
at the time. 
The President was placed in a delicate position, for 
the entire program of the administration might have suffered 
if the President lost influence over business and labor by 
doing nothing. Labor, in the steel industry, and perhaps 
generally, would certainly have had a cause for feeling duped 
or cheated, after demanding small wage packages only to 
see the companies increase prices. 
Business firms generally began to foresee increases in 
the prices of their products. But regardless of this prospect 
and its implications, after the rescission there was a de¬ 
pressed feeling in the business community. Some people 
even speculated that perhaps the subsequent stock market 
decline was related to the actions of the President. 
Other ways in which the public interest was affected 
included the moral implications involved in the relationships 
existing among the various parties, the economic effects of 
the price increases, and the philosophical implications of 
opposing political views held by Republican businessmen 
and Democratic administration members. 
-10- 
This capsule view of the public interest can lead 
us into a short discussion of social control of business, 
before we enter the realm of economic factors which will 
comprise a good portion of the paper. Much more could be 
said, but this paper cannot encompass the magnitude of 
the public interest, which is a subject for many possible 
volumes. 
CHAPTER II 
SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 
In April, 1962, all four of the parties comprising 
the public interest were involved, though some were more 
directly and completely participating. The labor participa¬ 
tion actually preceded the crisis. The parties in actual 
conflict were the major steel companies with some exceptions, 
and the Federal Government. 
r 
The crisis atmosphere involved several forms of con¬ 
flict; mental in the sense of theory or rationale; physical 
in the sense of combat or restraint; and emotional in the 
sense of indecision or anguish. This conflict exists even 
today, as it existed before the April, 1962 clash, for the 
incident under investigation merely brings to our attention 
the many basic problems which underlie the efficient func¬ 
tioning of the total American system. Between rounds the 
opponents prepare, gather facts and arguments, devise new 
strategies, and wait for new events to occur. The crisis is 
subdued; it may be analogous to the concept of a cold war 
within our system. It requires constant effort and vigilance. 
-11- 
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The flow of activity in our system is made possible 
by the continual operation and interaction of many sub¬ 
systems which have varying nature; the four major institu¬ 
tional components of our society represent systems of a 
particular sort, in terms of the public interest. But 
there are other systems, such as the legal system and the 
economic system, which are different ways of viewing the 
dynamics of organized phenomena called institutions, or 
frameworks, or some such name. 
One particular subsystem in which this chapter will 
have interest is the business community, and its relations 
with other subsystems such as the legal, economic, general 
public, labor, and government subsystems. 
For many years it was thought that our particular 
system would function most efficiently and beneficially 
through minimization of government interference with busi¬ 
ness policies and procedures. Labor unions were either non¬ 
existent or non-powerful during many of these years, and the 
scope of American government activities was tiny in comparison 
to the present. Business was a major factor in society. Adam 
Smith talked of an "invisible hand" which would guide the 
destiny of men into the greatest social good, through the 
-13- 
self ish profit motives of each individual business firm. 
The businessman was respected, and his activities did not 
disturb people very much in comparison with the present 
circumstances. There were instances of disturbance, e.g., 
business in its treatment of labor in certain working condi¬ 
tions, which formed a major long term problem. The American 
system being what it is, most of these problems found solu¬ 
tions, sometimes workable, sometimes not. 
Over the years profound changes occurred. The 
atomistic type of competition which confronted Adam Smith 
is virtually non-existent in modern America, save parts of 
the farm market, which even now is being affected by sub¬ 
sidies which modify the conditions of competition. In place 
of atomistic competition is found the corporate giant, in 
monopolistic competition, in monopoly, in oligopoly, and in 
new types of arrangements for which satisfactory solutions 
< 
have not been worked out. 
These features of modern America are the foundation 
for huge mass production systems, and rapid economic growth, 
while providing equally enormous problems for men to solve. 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (An Inquiry Into), 
W. R. Scott (ed.) (1925). 
-14- 
These conditions are the creations of man, and his problems, 
for as he created them, so he must live with them. 
The complexities of these modern circumstances are 
visible to even the most cursory eye, and to delve deeply 
into them here is impossible. The following chapters on 
economic factors involved in the steel situation will point 
this out quite sufficiently and vividly. 
The function of this chapter is to point out that an 
enormous problem does exist for man to solve. The power of 
the corporate complex is certainly not diminishing. To 
take only one example. General Motors last year reported a 
net profit after 52% taxes of more than one billion dollars. 
When one stops to think of the numbers of people employed by 
such a corporation in its many divisions, and about the 
tremendous amounts of capital controlled by a handful of 
key executives, it becomes clear that the individual is 
dwarfed by the firm in many ways. As a citizen he must ask 
his government to take a hand in controlling the corpora¬ 
tion, to learn about its activities, to ensure its actions 
are for the betterment of society as a whole. Hence we have 
General Motors Company Report, 1962. 
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today social control of business coining mainly through govern 
ment activity and intervention into many areas of business 
3 
and labor activity. 
In the American steel industry we find a structure of 
firms which are large and to a certain degree integrated. 
There are certain types of facilities used in steel produc¬ 
tion which operate most efficiently in complexes, and other 
types which are large and expensive. The industry is highly 
concentrated in that the largest ten firms control over 
eighty per cent of total industry capacity. The economic 
characteristics of the industry will be seen in the next two 
chapters. 
Many of the problems involved in the steel industry 
are of a controversial nature due to our inability to come 
to agreement on the degree to which steel influences the 
economy, or to which the steel industry is responsible for 
inflation in this country, or is responsible for a balance 
of payments problem. These questions are basic to the long 
J. M. Clark, Social Control of Business (University 
of Chicago, 1926), Chapter I, where Clark points out that 
social control is not exclusively a government activity, 
and that government intervention is not always on behalf 
of the public, but sometimes for an interest group. 
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term relationship of government and steel which will be 
discussed here in this paper. 
The government has intervened in various manners 
over the years into the activities of the steel industry. 
The beginning of this intervention is not important, but 
one of the first events which brought forth interest of 
government in steel was the formation of the United States 
Steel Corporation through a merger of many small companies 
in 1901. This giant corporation has been the center of at¬ 
tention in the steel industry every since. 
The government made an attempt to decrease the power 
of the company in a case that took ten years, at the end of 
4 
which the government lost. The industry has been the sub¬ 
ject of many Congressional inquiries over the years in an 
attempt by the government to learn more about its activities, 
and in reaction to price increases by the industry. Other 
methods and instances of intervention at various times are 
5 
also on record. 
Many of the instances of intervention have come during 
^United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 
417 (1920). 
^See Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry 
(U.S. Dept, of Labbr, 1961) for background; also see the 
other sources in the Public Document section of the final 
bibliography. 
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or after labor settlements. The usual pattern in labor 
negotiations is that the union makes high demands, in sane 
cases a strike comes, steel prices rise, and the public or 
government bear the burden. If government action comes, 
businessmen argue about free enterprise and the efforts of 
the government to take over business, as can be seen by 
reading the Wall Street Journal during any of these crises. 
In an attempt to pin down some of these gray areas 
where no facts are facts and where few rules are workable, 
we will discuss depreciation, prices, profits, competition, 
productivity, costs, steel and the business cycle, steel 
and the economy, and steel and inflation. 
CHAPTER III 
SOME ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
Depreciation 
The concept of depreciation is not peculiar to the 
steel industry, and its discussion here will serve the pur¬ 
pose of explaining the current arguments on depreciation to 
a limited degree, while also evaluating the particular case 
of depreciation and the steel industry. 
Depreciation provides a method for the recovery of 
cash outlays for fixed assets, i.e., buildings, machinery, 
and equipment of a long term nature. These assets must be 
purchased before production can begin, but the recovery of 
the invested cash will not come for many years as each piece 
produced brings in a little cash which can be thought of as 
return of capital. On the income statement of a firm, sales 
revenue minus expenses equals profits. Part of the category 
labeled expenses is depreciation, which is an expense of 
production, but is a non-cash expense, or non-cash charge 
in terms of the current income statement. As cash accumulates. 
-18- 
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the outlay for heavy equipment is returned. 
In times when the price level is changing, additional 
complications are introduced. When prices are continuously 
rising a company may be forced to pay a good deal more for 
a new piece of equipment to replace a worn out piece. There 
is a possibility for gradual erosion of business assets to 
occur because the depreciation methods allowed for tax 
purposes do not recognize changing price levels. However, 
it is also possible that a new piece of equipment will be 
more productive than the old piece, in which case cash cost 
is not truly indicative of the economic situation. 
Depreciation should provide enough funds through its 
non-cash charges to income to bring back the original amount 
of dollars to the firm on a historical cost basis. However, 
some firms argue that depreciation under conditions of 
changing prices should bring back dollars which will provide 
equal buying power as the original outlay had, while still 
others argue depreciation should bring back enough dollars 
to replace an asset when worn. A fourth view is that de¬ 
preciation should bring back enough dollars to represent 
actual wear, if the equipment were reappraised each year 
1 
according to current construction costs. 
^Gardiner Means, Pricing Power and the Public Interest 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 86-90. 
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The steel companies have argued that depreciation 
methods are insufficient (for tax purposes) in returning to 
the firm enough dollars to avoid gradual erosion of capital. 
This argument arises to justify price increases, and the 
companies have used it extensively. The most pronounced 
usage seems to come from the United States Steel Corporation, 
2 
and that firm has published its views. 
The company argument is that depreciation allowed is 
less than the amount needed, and the deficiency is cumulative. 
One company estimate of the extent of this deficiency was 
3 
$904 million from 1940 to 1957. The basis for the calcula¬ 
tion was not given, but Means has pointed out that the 
figure was based on an index of construction costs that used 
1913 as a base year, and included factors of facility con¬ 
struction which did not seem to fit the reality of current 
steel facility construction, i.e., 200 hours of unskilled 
4 
labor, no skilled labor, and other material costs. 
The company argument seems convincing at first 
glance, but the data upon which to make a judgment is 
Steel and Inflation: Fact vs. Fiction (New York: 
United States Steel Corporation, 1958); see pp. 34-36, 
151-161, 49-53. 
3Ibid., p. 34. 
^Means, op. cit., pp. 105-107. 
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scarce* One analysis which is reasonably well done is 
available, though based on inadequate data and some limiting 
assumptions necessary under the circumstances. This is the 
5 
analysis to which the author will turn for evidence. 
The analysis compares figures over a period of years, 
through the use of a base year from which a percentage 
change can be calculated. The base years used were 1942 and 
1953, and the writer pointed out that changing the base 
year in the calculations may drastically alter the results. 
This can be verified by checking the company, union, and 
outside analyses where three different base years were used, 
6 
1939, 1940, and 1942. 
Because of the rising price levels, net fixed capital 
per ton of steelmaking capacity, based on book value, rose 
37% between 1942 and 1953. Fixed capital and working capital 
together rose 31% in that period on the same basis. The 
capital return increased 50% during the period so that on a 
book value basis, return is sufficient to cover increased 
capital outlays. 
In the company argument several different ideas can 
5Ibid., pp. 86-111. 
6 
See ibid; also Steel and Inflation, op. cit., pp. 
151-161 
-22- 
be found regarding what depreciation should do, and the 
three things which seem to be in that argument are those 
(above) on equal buying power, replacement cost, and actual 
wear. The analyst felt that replacement cost might not 
always be a valid argument for depreciation need not replace 
a new plant as long as it provides dollars of equal buying 
/ 
power. For example, if a plant were to be depreciated over 
twenty years and cost a million dollars, ten years of de¬ 
preciation would provide half of a million dollars. If the 
price level then doubled, replacement cost would be two mil¬ 
lion, and depreciation would have to be tripled to meet that 
while it would only have to be doubled to meet equal buying 
power, for the remaining half million of buying power would 
mean recovering one million at the doubled price level. 
Hence 1.5 million would be recovered from equal buying power, 
but 2 million would have to be recovered under replacement 
cost. Only the 1.5 million makes any economic sense, ac¬ 
cording to the writer, and it appears that on an equal 
buying power basis, net fixed capital per ton increased 
59% from 1942 to 1953, while total capital per ton increased 
46%, and those would be covered by the 50% increase in capital 
return over the period. 
Turning to reproduction costs, one finds that the 
-23- 
company argument is based on the assertion that "a^ blast 
furnace" is always the same. One of the company officials 
called them "practically identical." Here are the figures 
on the output of those "practically identical" furnaces: 
rated capacity per furnace per day in 1929 was 665 tons; in 
7 
1939, 783 tons; in 1948, 902 tons; and in 1956, 1030 tons. 
The analyst felt that the service performed was being re¬ 
built, not the physical plant. A further example is a 
specific blast furnace which the company discussed. The 
furnace was built in 1910 and renovated in 1946, with an in¬ 
crease in cost of 460% over the 1910 cost. But the 1910 
capacity was 470 tons per day, while the 1946 capacity was 
1509 tons per day. The actual cost increase was not 460%, 
8 
but rather 75%. The furnace also required only one-fourth 
the labor input after renovation, and it is likely that 
there was a material saving too. 
The company estimate on the increase in construction 
costs between 1913 and 1956 was almost 600%, based on the 
index of the Engineering News-Record (mentioned above), which 
has weights unchanged since 1913, and includes 40% common 
7 
Steel and Inflation, op. cit., p. 58. 
Q 
Means, op. cit., p. 104. 
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labor. The analyst substitutes another index of the 
Engineering News-Record which he feels more appropriately 
employs skilled labor, and is substantially similar, and 
finds that index rose only 331% in the same period. 
Comparing the specific blast furnace above on this 
index, we find that from 1910 to 1946 the index rose 172%, 
while the actual cost rise as shown above was only 75%, 
much less than even the more valid index. 
The analyst concludes that it is likely that a figure 
smaller than book value figures would emerge from a competent 
estimate of the reproduction cost of facilities on the books 
in 1942, due to the high average age of the old equipment 
and the technical superiority of the new equipment. Hence 
as of 1953 there is no reason to reject historical cost as 
the proper basis until the company presents convincing evi¬ 
dence to the contrary. 
The analysis was carried forth to 1959 and reached 
similar conclusions, while stating that the data for these 
years is even more inadequate. The analyst thus places the 
burden of proof upon the industry, stating that book value 
could be adjusted either on buying power or reproduction 
cost, given that the company could show facts. In either 
case the result would be moderately higher than book values. 
-25- 
The arguments of the companies seem exaggerated, although 
one has no way of knowing if the preceding analysis is cor¬ 
rect, or if the analyst was biased unconsciously. The analysis 
does, however, disprove to some extent the $904 million 
9 
figure the company showed. 
Productivity 
Another company argument in defense of price in¬ 
creases centers on rate of increase in productivity. This 
concept is more difficult than depreciation to evaluate; no 
consensus can be found on what measures should be used to 
measure productivity, what the true rate of productivity in¬ 
crease in steel or the country is, or which of the two 
should be used as a guide for policy. Productivity refers 
to efficiency in use of resources, and if such resources 
are used increasingly more efficiently and fully, a firm 
will receive more output from a given input, and productivity 
is said to be increasing. 
The arguments are that the statistics on rate of in¬ 
crease in national productivity are inadequate; the Steelworkers 
^Steel and Inflation, op. cit., p. 34. 
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union feels company productivity is increasing much more 
rapidly than the company feels it is. Some people use out¬ 
put per man hour to measure productivity, which others say 
is inadequate; the true measure being output per total factor 
investment unit (whatever that is). The last argument above 
stems from the feeling that productivity is due to increased 
capital spending and efficiency as well as to increased 
labor productivity. Another factor which determines 
productivity is capacity usage, and steel is tied to the 
business cycle, limiting efficiencies of high capacity usage 
10 
especially in light of the over-capacity of the industry. 
The United Steelworkers of America is the bargaining 
agent for steel employees (hereafter called the union), and 
the contention of that union is that wage increases have not 
led to price increases; indeed, the union feels that even 
11 
higher wage increases could be met from productivity gains. 
12 
The company contends that this is not so. 
The figures used are total employment costs, and are 
°See "Wages, Prices, Profits, and Productivity," The 
15th American Assembly (New York: Columbia University, 1959), 
for a thorough discussion of the concepts included in this 
section. 
^Steel and Inflation, op. cit., p. 114. 
12Ibid.. pp.'114-126. 
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usually based on output per man hour. The company attempts 
to compare output per man hour paid for with cost per man 
hour worked. In that case output is going to be lowered 
since more hours are paid for than are worked, while cost is 
going to seem increased since fewer hours are worked. This 
type of presentation does not help to clarify matters. The 
parties (union and management) wage a propaganda battle with 
each other, and this represents problems in terms of an 
objective analysis. They can not agree on what exactly 
should be included in employment costs with the union 
focusing in many cases on wages while forgetting fringe 
benefits. 
The analysis by the economist the company chose found 
that productivity increased 56.3% between 1940 and 1956, 
while employment costs per man hour increased 211%. However, 
this is where the difference in hours worked and hours paid 
must be watched. Nothing is mentioned about total labor 
cost per ton of steel. The analysis continues to attempt to 
disprove many of the union contentions, while pointing out 
flaws in the union argument such as stating a union view that 
it had been forced to seek increases over the level of 
productivity, which contradicted an earlier statement that 
more could have been absorbed through productivity gains. 
-28- 
The analysis continues, stating that productivity is 
not increasing at an accelerating rate, but rather at a 
decelerating rate. Figures are then presented which the 
analyst feels show that steel wages have outstripped national 
productivity over the past years. These arguments must be 
watched carefully, for the companies and the union will 
seek to prove anything which looks better for themselves. 
A more objective analysis is presented by an economist 
who is interested in the industry (same man as in the pre- 
13 
ceding section on depreciation), which we shall move into 
after citing certain other sources. 
The management figures on productivity have been 
14 
given and they range from 2.5 to 2.9 per cent per year. 
The companies also rely on findings regarding the use of all 
inputs when figuring productivity, and on results indicating 
the long term trend in national productivity to be 1.7% 
from 1889 to present, and 2.1% from World War I to the 
15 
present. But then United States Steel Corporation Chairman 
13 
Means, op. cit., pp. 71-80, 118-150. 
^4Steel and Inflation, op. cit., p. 56. 
^American Iron and Steel Institute, The Competitive 
Challenge to Steel (New York: 1961), pp. 37-42; also 15th 
American Assembly, p. 43. 
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Roger Blough turned these figures of other people into the 
company's own figures when he stated that the company had 
found the long term increase since 1940 to be 1.7% (note he 
also said this was considerably below the 2.5% the contract 
required, and also note the other conflicting statement 
above from the same company that productivity ranged from 
16 
2.5 to 2.9 percent per year). Thus far the range indicated 
by various people is 1.7% to 2.9%. 
Another company relies on the figures of the Federal 
17 
Government, which calculated productivity at 2.6%. There 
are other sources, but these will only serve to complicate 
the matter. The government has attempted to clarify some of 
the problems involved, pointing out that output per man 
hour for the economy as a whole can be used as a guide for 
national policy on employment price increases which would be 
consistent with stable prices only under certain conditions. 
These conditions are that physical capital used and its cost 
per unit remain constant, and constant return to capital is 
seen as correct with increasing real wages. The government 
16 
News Conference held by Roger Blough on April 12, 
1962, New York. 
17 
A. C. Adams, Chairman Jones & Laughlin Steel, in a 
letter to President Kennedy dated September 13, 1961; cites 
nothing but the figure appears in Background Statistics Bearing 
on the Steel Dispute (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept, of Labor 
Bulletin No. S-l, October, 1959), p. 10. 
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18 
feels these conditions are fairly well met. 
The analysis which seemed to be the most thorough was 
the one by Means to which the author turned in the last 
section. That analysis found that total employment costs in¬ 
creased 83% between 1942 and 1953, which Means felt to be the 
reason for some of the increase in steel prices during the 
time period (he found in a later section that the price in¬ 
creases in those years were justified). The analyst carries 
his investigation into 1959, and finds that an annual in¬ 
crease in productivity is in the range of 4.2 to 5.2 per cent 
19 
for the period from 1953 to 1959- When this thesis gets to 
costs, prices, and profits, these findings will be discussed 
more. 
It should be noted here though, that where the 1942 to 
1953 figures the analyst presented seemed justified, the 
figures from 1953 to 1959 did not. The total employment 
cost increase per ton of steel was calculated to be about 
18% for the latter time period, while price increases were 
36%. Labor costs represent about one-third of steel costs, 
18 
Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept, of Labor, 1961), p. 157. 
19 
Means, op. cit., pp. 118-150. 
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and thus could not nearly have accounted for the price 
20 
increases during those years. 
The range of productivity figures encountered is 
now 1.7% by both the companies and an independent person 
in reference to the national economy over the last 70 years; 
the latter figure is per total factor input, not output per 
man hour. In later years the figure for the economy is 
2.1%. The companies gave other estimates over short and 
long run (not all mentioned here) which ranged from 2.5% to 
3.7%. An independent economist gives a range for later 
years of 4.2% to 5.2%. Hence no one seems to agree with any¬ 
one else in terms which can be analyzed and judged. The 
1.7% and 2.1% figures for the economy seem correct, but the 
problem is finding the correct figure for national policy. 
It would seem that in terms of national policy, the 
only figures which could be accepted would be the national 
figures. But in terms of steel management and union, it is 
doubtful that many settlements from the past would meet the 
2.1% standard, on a total factor input basis. The companies 
refer to settlements which cost much more than this. 
The exact figure may not be important in this paper. 
20 
Ibid. 
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but the concept of productivity is one of the company 
justifications for price increases. The union may gain 
settlements in excess of national productivity, but the 
companies may be gaining price increases in excess of what 
is needed. 
Competition 
One of the more interesting areas of study in this 
paper is the phenomenon of competition in the steel industry. 
This competition is actually of two distinct types, internal 
and external (terminology used for convenience). Internal 
competition as used here refers to the competition which 
exists among the firms in the American steel industry. Ex¬ 
ternal competition thus refers to foreign steel competition 
and competition from producers of substitutes for steel any¬ 
where in the world. 
A good deal of evidence exists regarding the competi¬ 
tion faced by the steel industry from foreign steel producers 
21 
and from producers of substitute products. Steel prices in 
21 
See the following: American Iron and Steel Institute, 
Foreign Trade Trends, annually; Charting Steel's Progress, 
annually; also The Competitive Challenge to Steel, op. cit.; 
and J. W. Ford, The Steel Import Problem (New York: Fordham, 
1961) . 
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this country seem to be high in relation to foreign steel 
prices for one reason or another. At this point the particu¬ 
lar reason is unimportant, but the fact remains that ex¬ 
ternal competition is severe. This does not help our 
balance of payments problem, for steel imports are increasing 
22 
and exports are decreasing. 
The external challenge to the steel industry is some¬ 
what new, for the American steel industry has been a major 
producer for world consumption. In a short period of time, 
our portion of world markets has been cut. The competition 
which exists outside the American steel industry would seem 
to be good, but the competitive position in which the in¬ 
dustry finds itself can be explained more readily by a dis¬ 
cussion of the internal competition in the industry. 
In the American steel industry non-price competition 
seems to exist and few people dispute this. There are ef¬ 
forts made by companies to advertise, to deliver on time, 
and to perform many other services for customers. But non¬ 
price competition does not do very much to set up a com¬ 
petitive market in steel because buyers are more interested 
in price. If a price is lowered, customers will buy. The 
22 
Collective Bargaining, op. cit., pp. 167-168. 
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steel industry is characterized by "price leadership" on 
the part of the United States Steel Corporation and "follower- 
23 
ship" by almost all other firms in almost all cases. 
Administered pricing is another characteristic of 
the industry, and this concept seems to involve executive 
determination of prices which are held constant while demand 
changes. Production is varied to meet demand at an in¬ 
flexible price. The market structure of the industry is 
such that the companies can keep the prices stable even in 
the face of severe drops in demand. The firms have a great 
deal of market power. The prices in the industry are in¬ 
flexible downward, but are flexible upward. They follow a 
24 
pattern which is constantly upward. 
Another characteristic of the industry is that almost 
all prices are identical, except for minor geographical dif¬ 
ferentials. The industry usually moves as one, for when one 
firm raises prices all follow. Very seldom are prices lowered. 
Hence where price competition would appear to be the 
23 
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Report on Administered 
Prices, No. 1387 (Washington, D.C.), pursuant to S. Res. 57 
as extended, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., March 13, 1958, esp. 
pp. 74-76. 
24J. M. Clark, The Wage-Price Problem (American Bankers 
Association, 1960), pp. 23-30. Clark has called this move¬ 
ment "ratchet-action." 
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type which would be most effective, it is almost precluded. 
If there is no price competition, very little is left. 
Many explanations were attempted at the Congressional 
25 
Hearings of 1957 but they were very unconvincing. The 
United States Steel Corporation has admitted through its 
26 
President in the past that it set prices in the industry. 
The present justification for the method of operation for a 
company in the industry is that everyone is meeting the 
market price, which is set by a small handful of executives 
at United States Steel. One meets the market price no matter 
which way it goes, up or down, despite conditions of demand 
27 
or over-capacity. 
As price leader United States Steel can not very well 
be meeting the market price so that company must justify 
its increases on the basis of costs, which is the usual 
pattern of answer by the company. 
Meeting the competitive price is actually the busi¬ 
ness concept of remaining competitive, but is not the 
economic concept of competition. One writer states that 
25 
26 
27 
Report on Administered Prices, 
Ibid., p. 74. 
Ibid. 
op. cit. 
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nothing in either classical or monopolistic types of competi¬ 
tion would necessarily lead to the inflexibility of ad- 
28 
ministered prices. 
Many officials were questioned at Congressional 
Hearings on the steel situation, but few could remember in¬ 
stances where companies other than United States Steel 
29 
initiated price increases. 
The logic behind this method of operation in the in¬ 
dustry is easily seen. United States Steel initiates a 
price increase or decrease; all companies will instantly 
meet a decrease so nothing is gained for any individual 
company unless total industry revenue is increased. The 
industry has argued that demand is price inelastic in the 
case of steel, so that such an increase in revenue is not 
probable (this is also one of the justifications given for 
not lowering prices). Hence in the individual company's 
eyes it makes no sense to lower prices because if no one 
does everyone will make money and be happy except, perhaps, 
the general public. In no case will a company go lower on 
decrease than United States Steel. 
28 
Means, op. cit., pp. 26-29. 
29 
Report on Administered Prices, op. cit. 
If the move was an increase, everyone can make more 
money if all the prices are "competitive," because this is 
almost like a monopoly. For example, there are only four 
companies in this country who make rails, and all four 
prices are identical. If one wishes to buy rails, one pays 
the price; this is essentially a monopoly price.30 
The dangers of price wars are such that smaller 
% 
companies have little choice in following in most cases. 
The cut-throat competition which would emerge would be 
disaster for small firms for the larger firms have the power 
to hold out longer. 
United States Steel has also given a figure for a 
target rate of return on investment for which the company 
supposedly aims. Pricing is said to be bottomed on the con 
cept of 8% return on investment over the long run, and it 
: - > t > 
appears that overcapacity and fluctuating demand are looked 
upon more favorably by the industry than stable production 
with fluctuating price. If everyone can make a reasonable 
profit, everyone is happy, but the general public perhaps, 
or maybe the government. 
30 
Ibid., p. 74. 
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The state of competition in the industry is not 
healthy. It is not merely the fact that prices happen to 
be identical that is the problem, but how they got that 
way, why they move together to stay that way, and why the 
movements are almost always upward. Words on competition do 
not make a price competitive, and neither does meeting the 
market price. The question of legitimate prices enters 
31 
into the picture. 
It appears that some sort of an unwritten agreement 
exists in the steel industry which effectively maintains the 
status quo. This is difficult to prove, since everyone who 
follows decides for himself to follow, or so they say. 
Executives at some of the Hearings make statements which 
make the reader feel like a fool. They seem to have every¬ 
thing under quiet control. They have stated that everyone 
will follow a price increase to remain competitive, and that 
even though united States Steel may not even be a leading 
producer of some products, it still sets the prices of those 
products. 
The responsibility for price levels seems to drift 
out into nowhere, with everyone trying to meet a competitive 
■^Defined by Means, op. cit., pp. 158-60, as rate of 
return on investment equal to cost of capital for firm. 
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price, and United States Steel setting the price on the 
basis of its costs. As long as United States Steel can 
justify price increases through costs, it appears that 
prices will keep going up. Followers do not follow any 
pattern of being more or less efficient and raising and 
not raising prices? they all raise. 
Costs 
The costs of the steel companies are a major factor 
in the determination of legitimacy in pricing. Most firms 
do not make the data available, which may not be a loss, 
since most follow United States Steel and the latter abounds 
in public relations material in attempts to justify price 
increases. 
Most price increases occur after the signing of labor 
contracts, which is possibly a company attempt to associate 
prices with wages. This general approach by business firms 
caused in good part the concept of the wage-price spiral, 
and it is similar to the vicious circle concept. If steel 
firms can raise prices and make good profits, then the union 
should get as much as possible for the workers, since both 
-40- 
the wage and price increase will actually be paid for by the 
general public. 
The American system provides for free collective 
bargaining and price determination. However, there are op¬ 
portunities for certain sectors to take advantage of their 
privileges. Union and management in the steel industry can 
take the people on the proverbial ride if they are not watched. 
The general public must pay the higher prices and suffer from 
inflationary tendencies if sectors take advantage of the op¬ 
portunities which the system offers to those who do not 
have the integrity to bear their responsibility to the public 
interest. This is one example of the tremendous dynamics of 
our system, where the forces are at play, turning into some 
relationship which may or may not be equitable. 
One analysis of costs in the steel industry by Means 
studies the movement of the costs from 1942 to 1953, and then 
32 
from 1953 to 1959. The Wholesale Price Index rose 72% be¬ 
tween 1942 and 1953, while steel prices rose 100%. Total 
33 
labor costs rose 83% in the period. Material costs rose 
114% per unit of output between 1942 and 1953, according to 
32 
Means, op. cit., pp. 65-150. 
33Ibid. , pp'. 78-80. 
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the study, and when combined with labor and service costs, 
the total increase amounts to almost 100%. The producer 
margin increased 100% for the period. The author concluded 
that for the period from 1942 to 1953, price increases in¬ 
stituted by the industry were justified. 
Total labor costs rose 18% from 1953 to 1959, while 
steel prices rose 36%. The companies argue that costs 
which are non-labor tend to increase at the same rate as 
the labor cost. This is not so after 1953 according to 
Means. After 1953, operating costs increased about 10% as 
opposed to 18% for labor costs. The figure the analysis 
gives as the legitimate figure for the period from 1953 to 
1958 is 14%. The actual rise was 36%. Means concluded that 
the producer margin must have been doubled in the short six- 
year period. 
Means then turns to an analysis of breakeven points 
34 
from the 1957 Hearings. According to the breakeven 
analysis. United States Steel would have broken even in 1953 
at 47% of capacity as an operating rate, while in 1959 
they would have broken even at little more than 30% of 
capacity, as shown by a later analysis from the same expert. 
34 
Ibid., pp. 147-48. Analysis by Fred Gardner. 
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This iiniriediately indicates that higher profit margins were 
operating. 
The viewpoint of United States Steel is that for the 
period from 1939 to 1956, the rise in material and service 
costs was 169%, as compared to an increase of 148% in prices. 
In the same time period, employment costs rose 211% while 
35 
productivity rose 56%. The study reverts back and forth 
to different base years and short term comparisons in much 
the same manner that the union study does, and changing the 
base will change the results. It is amazing that a company 
which feels it is incurring so many costs is able to break 
even at 30% of capacity; 47% is excellent, but 30% is 
phenomenal. 
Another study is available, which concentrates mainly 
36 
on wages in the cost area. According to this study, prices 
increased 178% between 1940 and 1959, while average realized 
price per ton increased 207%, and employment cost per ton 
increased 145% for wage employees and 170 to 188% for all 
employees (the two figures are based on the work of two dif¬ 
ferent people who prepared background papers for the study). 
^Steel and Inflation, op. cit., pp. 114 ff. 
36Collective Bargaining, cp. cit., pp. 162-164. 
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The Government study concludes that employment costs ac¬ 
count for one-third of the increase in prices between 1940 
and 1959. Material and service costs account for about 45% 
• * 
of the increased prices, and hence between them they (labor 
and materials) account for over 80% of the increases in 
prices since material and service costs increased 205% in 
/ 
the period. 
These results tend to agree with industry results 
and oppose those of Gardiner Means. Eckstein and Fromm re¬ 
port that wages and prices were both exceeding legitimate 
levels (as defined above). They felt that employment costs 
had fallen slightly, while material and service costs had 
fallen considerably (this study changed the base year to 
1947, which Means condemned). 
The data are divergent once again, as perhaps is to 
be expected in such an area of investigation, but some 
sources should receive more weight than others. This writer 
personally favors the analysis by Means, which shows that 
price increases were not justified after 1953, since it is 
the most complete. The others seem inaccurate in comparison. 
The information presented here gives only the barest 
summary of extensive work carried on by those referenced, and 
hence may seem abrupt# but that is not the case; a good deal 
of material stands behind the findings. 
-44- 
Prices and Profits 
The primary interest in prices of steel products comes 
after 1953, since many prices were rising until that time. 
This date marks the approximate end of the war inflations, and 
relative price stability set in for two years before a new 
inflationary movement set in. 
The industry pricing method has been covered, and it 
is called administered prices; this is merely the mechanics 
of the matter. The industry prices in search of a target 
rate of return, which in the case of United States Steel was 
stated as eight per cent, though as of 1959 it appeared to 
be closer to sixteen per cent. 
One can now see much of the pricing phenomenon in the 
industry, and there can be little doubt that many people are 
confused by the complexity of the situation. One phenomenon 
which has not been discussed is the concept of the "area of 
discretion," mentioned in the 1957 Hearings. This refers 
to the ability of steel companies to price within a range 
which will satisfy most of the companies as well as serve 
to lessen somewhat the constant effects of rising prices. 
A farmer can not go to the market and get more for his eggs 
than the going rate, but in steel there is an area in which 
-45- 
such discretion is possible. Officials of certain steel 
companies have even admitted to the market power which 
exists, stating that steel company officials must exercise 
responsibility in setting prices. There is a point to which 
all companies will follow, and beyond that point they may 
not follow. This forms the upper limit of the area, while 
the lower limit would supposedly be formed by the lowest 
price which will either cover the costs at United States 
Steel, or keep everybody happy in the industry. 
This is the problem in discussing prices in the public 
interest. If a company has a good deal of market power, 
this power can obviously be used to the detriment of society. 
The industry did not follow legitimate practices from 1953 
to 1959, for profit margins went up, much beyond the target 
rate of return sought by the companies. ^cme evidence is 
available which shows that wage increases from 1959 to 1962 
were matched by productivity gains on an output per man 
37 
hour basis. If this is truly the case, then little has 
changed since 1959. Perhaps this would lead one to conclude 
that price increases in 1962 were indeed not justified, al¬ 
though we have noted the complexity of such matters. 
■^Statement given to President Kennedy on April 11, 
1962, by W. Duane Evans of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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However, disturbing evidence in terms of profits 
shows that in 1962 profit levels were lower than they had 
been for some time. The industry was operating at a low 
level of capacity, but certainly United States Steel with 
its low breakeven point should have made good profits. This 
is one of the conflicts in the evidence which tends to in¬ 
hibit strong conclusions. 
Prices in the American steel industry do not respond 
to the forces of recession either. In fact, prices increased 
in steel in the 1958 recession, and hence were a strong 
part of the curious duo of recession and inflation simul¬ 
taneously. Other prices increased that year as inflation 
involves a widespread rise in price levels. 
In another section of the paper it was mentioned that 
the steel company officials felt that each cent increase in 
labor cost brought another cent increase in other costs, so 
that total costs increased two cents. A formula is re¬ 
portedly used by the industry for quickly calculating amounts 
of price increases. A figure which is double the industry’s 
estimated cost is multiplied by a traditional figure of 
twenty man hours (more recently a 15 hour figure is used), 
which in case of a 24 cent increase in labor cost, leads to 
-47- 
38 
a predicted price increase of $9.60. 
It has been shown that other costs increase only 50% 
as much as labor costs in recent years, and other evidence is 
available which indicates that it takes only 12.5 man hours 
39 
to produce a ton of steel as of 1956. This would indicate 
an increase of about $4.50 instead of the $9.60 indicated by 
the company method. 
Needless to say, the industry feels it is losing 
money without price increases, and feels that costs are high 
40 
and profits are low. This is self-evident in terms of 
what we have presented in prior sections. 
Gardiner Means found that profits and prices are high. 
Eckstein and Fromm find the profit margin to be widening, and 
find that prices have increased considerably in a short span 
41 
of time in the steel industry. 
38 
Dirlam, Kaplan and Lanzilotti, Pricing in Big 
Business (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1958), p. 16. 
^Louis Lister, Europe1s Coal and Steel Community 
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), p. 68. 
40 
Steel and Inflation, op. cit. 
^Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, Steel and the Postwar 
Inflation, Study Paper No. 2 in connection with Hearings on 
Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Washington, D.C. 
86th Congress, 1st Session, November 6, 1959. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE 
UNITED STATES ECONOMY 
The Cyclical Problem 
Steel is a product of such nature that consumers will 
seldcm buy it for its own sake; steel is of little use un¬ 
less one can do something with it, i.e., build automobiles, 
refrigerators, homes, factories, buildings, bridges, and 
crher structures. Most of the uses of steel are for con- 
s-jsrver and industrial purposes. Hence they must be related 
to rhe business cycle. There may be other uses which govern 
rents right promote either on a constant basis, or when the 
tusiraess cycle hits low points, the latter as part of public 
works spending. 
The close ties of the steel industry to the business 
cycle j»ean that steel will not be purchased in large 
quantities if no one is purchasing the final products which 
incorporate steel into their construction. Hence production 
-48- 
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of steel will rise and fall with the business cycle. 
This paper has shown some of the characteristics of 
the steel industry in the preceding chapter. When demand 
rises and falls, production rises and falls, but price 
remains constant at best, or rises slowly over the years. 
Hence it can be seen that this relation of steel to the 
i 
business cycle provided a basis for the industry to keep its 
prices steady while allowing production to vary, and this was 
the road chosen by the industry. 
In foreign countries, prices fall during recession 
years, as would be expected, and the pattern of constantly 
2 
rising prices seems unique in this country. The constant 
rise in prices will not help the steel industry of this 
country to maintain or increase its competitive position 
during recession years, or for that matter, during years of 
prosperity; the price of foreign steel falls, and it is 
cheaper to import in some cases. This is not universal be¬ 
cause the cost of shipping steel can be an important factor 
Background Statistics Bearing on the Steel Dispute 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Dept, of Labor, October, 
1959), Bulletin No. S-I, p. 22; also Report on Administered 
Prices, U.S. Senate No. 1387, March, 1958, pp. 8, 18-22, 23-31. 
2 
Background Statistics, op. cit., p. 35. 
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in the final price, which can limit the ability of foreign 
producers to compete effectively in this country. This 
disadvantage has not stopped our imports from increasing 
yet, nor has it stopped our exports from decreasing. 
Other problems are created by the fluctuation of pro¬ 
duction in the American steel industry. When production 
falls to low levels and prices remain high, unemployment 
in the steel industry rises. This causes union grief, and 
has caused in the past a good deal of union effort to force 
the companies to provide employee security or job security 
benefits. These benefits cost money, which reduces profits, 
and gives the companies another argument to use when attempting 
to justify price increases. On the other hand, the higher 
prices bring profits back up, and gives the union an inviting 
target for further demands when negotiations take place. 
The heavy fixed costs of the industry also do not 
diminish during recessions. Per unit fixed cost will 
obviously increase when fewer units are produced, and this 
again causes a problem in terms of profits or justification 
for increasing prices. Cost patterns in the steel industry 
change during recession years, with per unit employment 
costs rising sharply, although material costs rise little 
-51- 
if at all. The increase of per unit employment costs 
results from the inability of the industry to cut as many 
workers from its payroll as would be needed to maintain the 
cost at a steady level. some of the employees are non¬ 
production workers who can not be released readily. 
The relation of these problems to productivity has 
already been shown, for the industry is not efficient until 
high levels of capacity utilization are achieved, and 
capacity utilization can influence short term productivity 
rates. Profits are likewise tied to rate of capacity utiliza 
tion. 
The Facility Problem 
The problem of industry capacity is another in¬ 
teresting aspect of relation here. There is a good deal of 
excess capacity in the industry, and there has been for 
some time. The problem is further complicated by the high 
average age of many of the American facilities, which are 
not as efficient as modern facilities. The destruction of 
^Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Dept, of Labor, 1961), p. 163. 
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foreign steel facilities during World War II resulted in 
many new and modern plants during reconstruction after the 
war* This has been one more factor which has worked to the 
disadvantage of the American steel industry. 
To combat the advantage of the foreign producers, 
much of the American steel plant must be modernized. This 
will only serve to add to the capacity of the industry. 
But the demand for steel is such that this capacity can not 
be utilized under present conditions. The damage has al¬ 
ready been done for imports are higher, exports are lower, 
other materials are competing with steel in many areas where 
steel was formerly the sole or major material supplier, and 
hence the average rate of capacity will fall even more when 
capacity is added, unless new markets are developed, or old 
markets are regained. High prices do not help the steel in¬ 
dustry in this area. The need for the new capacity is clear, 
but as seen here, the problem is two-sided, and the predica¬ 
ment of the industry is also clear. The capacity should be 
added; it would certainly be needed in event of war, which 
constantly threatens us, and modern capacity would enable 
quicker retaliation and more sustained long term efforts if 
needed. The industry is criticized for the excess capacity 
'/ 
-53- 
until it is needed, then the demands upon the industry in¬ 
crease. Perhaps this is an unjust criticism, but some of 
the other actions of the industry lead to it, and these 
actions are not always approved. 
The position which has been taken by the Federal 
Government in Congressional Hearings is one of confusion 
over the state of price patterns during recessions, and de¬ 
bate over the need to maintain prices while production 
drops. It would seem that the Government would like to see 
production steady at a relatively high rate of operation 
with prices fluctuating and more opportunity for the industry 
4 
to regain its markets and compete effectively. This would 
perhaps help to solve some of the problems set out above, 
and there can be no doubt that those problems assume major 
proportions in the relation of steel to the public interest 
and the economy. 
The Impact of Steel On The Economy 
The exact importance of steel in the economy may seem 
self-evident, but the question has been debated for some time 
^Report on Administered Prices, op. cit., entire 74 
pages for full development of theme. 
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now, with the companies arguing that steel is relatively un¬ 
important in terms of some of our problems in this country. 
Government studies conflict in their estimation of the im¬ 
portance of steel, and some of the economists are split. 
One economist, Jules Backman, has done some work on 
5 
the importance of steel prices in the consumer price index. 
This work tends to support the company argument, and the 
work was done for the company argument; Backman does work 
for United States Steel, and this piece appears in their 
publications, although originally prepared for the 1957 
Hearings to which the footnotes have referred. 
His findings are that the major items in the index 
which would be affected by a price increase account for 
about 12% of the weight of the total index. The cost of 
steel as a per cent of list price of some of the items on 
the index varies from 4% to 10%, depending on the particular 
item chosen. Backman points out that the United States Com¬ 
missioner of Labor Statistics had commented once that the 
1956 increase in steel prices would have had a negligible 
5 
Jules Backman, "The Importance of Steel Prices 
in the Consumer Price Index," in Steel and Inflation, Fact 
vs. Fiction (New York: United States Steel Corporation, 
1958), pp. 75-81 fo£ all of Backman's findings. 
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effect on the index, but the Commissioner subsequently 
pointed out in a letter to Senator Kefauver (deceased) in 
6 
1957 that the effect would be delayed but would be definite. 
Thus it would appear that steel does have some effect on 
the index, though the extent is debatable; the Commissioner 
declined to estimate the effect on the index by the 1956 
price increase. The economist later points out through 
analysis that changes in steel prices do not show any clear- 
cut relationship to changes in the index. This is seemingly 
correct, but the Wholesale Price Index would seem to be a 
better choice for comparison of changes in steel prices and 
changes in index prices? this was also discussed, but the 
data used ended in 1956, while the period in which interest 
is centered here ends in 1959. The conclusions were similar 
for the latter index. The economist concluded that steel 
prices do not determine the price levels of the CPI or the 
WPI, though they may be important in some sectors of the 
economy. 
The above results conflict sharply with the results 
^Letter to Senator Estes Kefauver from Ewan Clague, 
dated September 25, 1957, in Hearings on Administered Prices, 
United States Senate, part 3, Appendix A, pp. 1053-54? full 
reference in final bibliography. 
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7 
of a later Government study. This later study found steel 
prices profoundly influenced the price level of the WPI over 
the period from 1949 to 1959: 
If steel prices had behaved like other industrial 
prices the total wholesale price index would have 
risen by 40 percent less over the last decade and 
less by 52 percent since 1953. Finished-goods 
prices would have risen less by 23 and 38 percent, 
respectively. 8 
This is related to the position of steel in the economy, 
and steel and inflation, though perhaps the reason for any 
inflationary forces the steel industry exerts is not clear 
at this point; that will be discussed shortly. It does 
point out, however, that steel is thought by some to have a 
definite effect on the economy and the price levels in this 
country. 
Another study points out that the influence exerted 
on steel prices is minor in its effects on three indices, 
but has an effect on the WPI (the three other indices are 
the CPI, GNP Implicit Price Deflator, and the Personal Con¬ 
sumption Expenditures Implicit Price Deflator) of finished 
7 
Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, Steel and the Post- 
war Inflation, in connection with 1959 Hearings on Employ 
ment. Growth, and Price Levels, Joint Economic Committee; 
full reference in final bibliography. 
8Ibid.. pp. 6-14, 34. 
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9 
goods. 
Steel has been estimated to constitute between 2.5% 
and 4.7% of the economy, depending on what measure is chosen 
for comparison purposes. Steel sales in 1955 were 2.5% of 
total corporate sales, 3.6% of the GNP in that year, and 4.7% 
of the GNP less services.^ (There are other comparisons 
which could be made, such as total assets, so that one 
should not place too much emphasis on any given set of 
figures someone publishes.) The importance of steel in the 
CPI has been shown to be about 12% (above), and about 5.8% 
of the WPI. This led the company analyst to conclude that 
11 
steel is not very important as stated above. 
Another study concerned with the impact of steel 
strikes upon the economy concluded that the impact is usually 
not as severe as people believe, when viewed over a time 
period which includes a period before and after the actual 
12 
strike. The conclusion is based upon analysis of operating 
Collective Bargaining, op. cit., pp. 179-96 for 
full presentation. 
10Backman, in Steel and Inflation, op. cit., p. 105. 
11Ibid., pp. 75-81, 100-105. 
•^Collective Bargaining, op. cit., pp. 31-49 for full 
presentation. 
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levei before and after any given strike in the steel in¬ 
dustry, and upon analysis of inventory levels of raw steel, 
seni-finished goods, and finished goods. It is shown that 
the industry operates at higher levels before and after the 
strike, and that inventory levels usually absorb the shock 
of the strike to the point where little loss of production 
cr goods on the market results. Even in the 116 day steel 
strike of 1959 the economy was shown to have suffered little 
free shortage of goods. This is seen in the study as a 
call for less government intervention. It should be pointed 
out that the inventory strike hedge accumulation which takes 
place before a strike is costly, in that some funds have to 
be tied up in the inventory, and if the strike hedge is wide¬ 
spread, this can assume the proportions of a major economic 
waste. One might think this is unimportant at this time for 
the union and the firms are at a point of better relations 
where strikes may be averted in the future, but the fact is 
that there have been five major strikes in the steel industry 
since unionism became widespread in steel. The industry has 
been unionized since the late 'thirties, and the five strikes 
have occurred between 1946 and 1959. This is one of the 
reasons for the concern of the public and the Government 
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over the steel industry. 
The study of the impact of steel strikes also points 
out that the pressures upon the parties to settle become 
substantially irresistible when the strikes begin to reach 
critical proportions, and these pressures usually bring 
about settlement. The study further concludes that there 
have been costs to the parties during strikes such as loss 
of income to workers, and costs of shutdown and startup to 
the steel firms, but the final conclusion states that steel 
strikes have not caused irreparable damage to the economy. 
The degree to which steel prices and wages lead the 
levels of prices and wages in the country is an area of 
dispute. The firms argue that steel prices do not lead 
other prices, and this paper has shown that an economist feels 
steel prices are relatively unimportant in the economy, after 
having studied the matter. Another study was shown which 
agrees with that viewpoint. Another economist has shown 
that steel prices do lag behind other prices both in periods 
of rising prices and declining prices. The pattern is that 
other prices tend to move in a given direction and then re¬ 
verse, while steel prices move more slowly but continue to 
surpass the others shortly after they reverse. In the case 
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of increases, the steel prices continue to rise long after 
other prices peak off and return to a slowly increasing 
13 
pattern. 
An outline of past history in steel labor-management 
negotiations tends to develop a feeling in the mind of this 
writer that patterns in settlements are led not only by the 
steel industry, which has occurred, but also by the auto¬ 
mobile settlements between the three largest manufacturers 
and the United Automobile Workers, which has occurred more 
14 
frequently. Other settlements may influence the pattern of 
steel settlements somewhat. It is difficult for the public 
to assess this matter carefully, because of the coverage 
given in the press to major bargains, and the inability of a 
person to actually follow all settlements. Hence it may be 
that the major settlements have greater influence on public 
opinions. 
13 
Gardiner Means, Pricing Power and the Public 
Interest (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 54, 60, 
63, 66, 67, 69, and 71, charts and text. 
14 
Collective Bargaining, op. cit.# Appendix A, pp. 
231-307. 
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The Steel Industry and Inflation 
Several types of inflation have been recognized by 
most economists. These are the Classical demand-pull monetary 
type of inflation? the wage-push inflation, and the cost- 
push inflation? and administrative inflation. These may be 
widespread or sectoral. 
Classical demand-pull monetary inflation results 
from an excess of total monetary demand, in a sector or 
in the entire economy, relative to the amount of goods 
which are available or which the economy can produce within 
a short period of time, to satisfy the demand. The capacity 
of the economy to expand quickly might be limited in the 
short run by a shortage of labor or materials, which would 
add to the demand problem until such a bottleneck was removed. 
It might be that few resources from other sectors of the 
economy could not be shifted to the bottleneck sector. Once 
the demand is met the pressures on prices will abate, but by 
this time the price level will have been pulled up by the 
increase of various individual prices due to the shortage 
of goods and the money available for purchasing them. This 
type of inflation is sometimes characterized as "too much 
money chasing too few goods," and it refers to the fact that 
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when money is abundant and goods are scarce, prices rise. 
The problem of price flexibility also should be dis¬ 
cussed. It has been shown that steel prices are flexible 
upward, but relatively inflexible downward. 'Where supply 
exceeds demand prices should fall, in opposition to the 
situation where demand exceeds supply and prices are pulled 
upward. In the steel industry, production is allowed to 
fluctuate in relation to demand so that when demand falls, 
production falls, and excess capacity takes up the excess 
supply in the short run, and in the case of the steel in¬ 
dustry this is extended into the long run. In traditional 
theory price would fluctuate with supply and demand inter¬ 
actions, and output would come at the most efficient point. 
A firm with excess capacity would have higher costs but would 
not be able to price any higher than the economically com¬ 
petitive price, and hence would be forced to eliminate excess 
capacity or be eliminated from the industry. 
In classical inflation the demand schedule shifts 
upward to the right. In a push type inflation, where 
prices are said to be pushed up by some type of costs, rather 
than pulled up by demand, the shift comes in the supply 
curve upward to the left. What effect this has on quantity 
sold depends upon the shape of the demand curve, but the 
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price will have to be higher under push type influences 
before the supplier will sell or supply more, either because 
costs are higher or because profits are higher (which is 
resultant in what is called administrative inflation). 
(The basic difference is between the Classical, and the 
other three types recognized here.) In the push-type cases, 
quantity must fall somewhat if demand is less than perfectly 
inelastic or does not shift. 
However, where supply interacts with a given demand 
schedule in traditional theory, in the case of the modern 
steel industry the supply or production is deliberately 
limited to the quantity demanded with a given demand schedule 
in order to maintain the price. The supply curve, then, 
shifts upward to the left to meet any given quantity 
demanded, in all cases but the Classical inflation, when 
discussing the steel industry. Supply almost never shifts 
downward to the right because prices almost never fall. 
Prices can be increased in steel because the demand is rela¬ 
tively inelastic. If no substitutes exist (as with rails), 
the full prior quantity demanded will continue unless it be¬ 
comes unprofitable to buy steel, and thus prices could go 
even higher as the supply curve shifts upward to the left 
into equilibrium with a perfectly inelastic demand schedule 
at a higher price. 
; ' : ^ " “64“ 
Market power helps the companies keep the prices up 
though in some areas foreign competition and other materials 
may have some limiting effect. It works through the supply 
curve, but this does not say where the revenue goes. It may 
go to increased costs or to profit. It is a vicious cycle 
for when demand goes up, prices are likely to go up; but 
when prices fall, production is limited. 
The increase of prices in steel may constitute 
sectoral inflation, but the usual type of inflation which 
worries the public is the type where many prices increase 
until the point is reached where price levels generally 
are increased. Inflation is then a widespread phenomenon. 
According to one analysis above, the steel industry 
increased prices altogether too much in the 1953-1959 period. 
Not only did wages increase substantially, but profits also 
increased. The analysis pointed out that while steel of¬ 
ficials were seeking an eight per cent return on investment, 
they were getting one more in the neighborhood of sixteen 
15 
per cent. Hence the industry contributed to the new push- 
15 
Means, Pricing Power, op. cit., p. 146, in relation 
to United States Steel, where they would have made 8% in 
1953, they would have made 16% at the same rate of operation 
in 1959. 
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type inflation more than needed, which is supported by the 
analysis of Eckstein and Fromm which stated that price 
levels would have risen much less than they actually did, 
if steel prices had behaved in a manner similar to all other 
16 
prices. 
Some economists still do not agree with the concept 
of the push type of inflation, while some do. Some trace the 
push type back to demand pull. Actually the push type can 
contribute to a pull type inflation, in that wages are 
actually income that can be spent, and profits are income 
which could be spent. Undoubtedly both push and pull type 
forces were at work in the 1955-1957 period, but not to 
the extent, in the case of pull type forces, that was the 
case from 1940-1953 in inflationary periods during those 
years. In any event, pull type forces would not seem to 
have been very important in the 1958 recession, where infla¬ 
tion also occurred. Steel prices were increased in 1958. 
Actually steel prices rose over fifty dollars per ton as an 
average in the period from 1953 to 1958. The average price 
of steel per ton at the time was only somewhere around 
16 
Steel and the Postwar Inflation, op. cit., pp. 6-14, 
34; if steel prices had risen a percentage-wise total similar 
to the rise in other prices. 
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one-hundred and seventy dollars per ton (1958), although it 
is difficult to locate the exact figure. 
The companies argue that rising prices are a result 
of inflation, not a cause of inflation, which is true under 
Classical inflation. It is not true that under push or ad¬ 
ministrative inflation rising prices are a result — they are 
the cause. The companies do not choose to recognize this, 
nor do they choose to recognize administrative inflation. 
They do choose to accuse the union of causing push type in¬ 
flation, which would seem to contradict their argument that 
rising prices are a result of inflation. 
Eckstein and Fromm show that the causes of the post¬ 
war inflation are from several main sectors of the economy, 
namely cost of services, cost of government, cost of machinery, 
17 
and cost of industrial and commercial construction. They 
show that in the 1955 to 1958 period, steel prices, which 
represent eight per cent of the Wholesale Price Index, ac¬ 
counted for twenty-two per cent of the rise in the level of 
the index. (The steel company economist had stated that 
steel prices accounted for less than six per cent of the WPI.) 
The eight per cent figure is a result of items which can 
17 
Ibid., p. 3. 
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definitely be attributed to steel, but using input-output 
analysis, the authors conclude that the total weight of 
steel in the WPI is 10.9%, which is considerably higher than 
the industry economist found. The input-output technique 
facilitates analysis of sales and purchases to and from each 
industry in the economy, and thus permits more careful estima¬ 
tion of the true effect of steel in the economy. The analysis 
performed by the authors assumed that price increases in steel 
were neither absorbed by user industries, nor passed on with 
an additional markup on cost, both of which might actually 
be expected to happen. This assumption may tend to bias 
the results against the favor of the industry. 
The authors comment on the work of the economist con¬ 
nected with the steel company (United States Steel), stating 
that the CPI is a particularly bad index to choose for 
this type of work, though they point out that the WPI, 
which they used, excludes services, retail trade, and con¬ 
struction, making steel loom larger than it would in GNP. 
Another study has shown that other than the WPI, 
18 
the effects of steel are minor (cited above p. 56). 
•^Collective Bargaining, op. cit., pp. 176-96. 
The 
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author found far lower results than Eckstein and Fromm, and 
criticizes their approach on some of the limitations that 
have been pointed out above. In particular, that author 
points out that increased prices may be partially the result 
of inflation in other industries, such as material suppliers 
and freight services. 
The author continues to discuss inflation, naming 
three notions which are useful; inflation may come in final 
product prices where intermediate products are used up (here 
he believes the GNP deflator is the most comprehensive index 
and should be used); inflation may occur in consumer prices 
(in which case the CPI or the Personal Consumption Expenditures 
deflator would be most appropriate); or inflation may occur 
at the primary market level (in which case the finished 
goods WPI is the best to use). 
Final product prices are a result of cost of value 
added before steel (materials, services), during production 
in steel, and after the steel production (user industries). 
Steel industry responsibility is limited to the cost of value 
added while processing in the steel stages, according to the 
author, who is using national income accounting concepts. 
The cost of value added in an industry for present 
purpose consists of wages, profits, depreciation, and indirect 
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business taxes. The work of Eckstein and Fromm, Gardiner 
Means, the results of the Congressional Hearings, and some 
of the work of the companies, shows that wages and prices 
were operating factors in the inflation of 1955-1958. 
Perhaps inadequate depreciation was also present. Pro¬ 
ductivity would also seem to be related here in terms of 
short run effects. 
The analysis continues to discuss other areas, and 
these are too detailed to discuss fully at this point, but 
the conclusions are that the Eckstein and Fromm figure of 
23% for the inflationary extent of steel prices can be 
reduced to 15% because of inflation in other sectors before 
\ 
and after steel production, given that the WPI finished goods 
index is accepted as valid. If other indices are accepted 
the extent is much less (as pointed out above). Steel price 
increases will caa se less than one per cent increase in the 
price level even given a 100% increase in steel prices, 
when relating this to the cost of capital facilities in the 
long run; that is another finding. Firms may collect cost 
increases over a period of time, and increase prices when 
steel prices are increased, given demand conditions that are 
not adverse. In conclusion the author found that the infla¬ 
tionary effect of steel prices in the postwar period has 
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bee n modest, as the companies contend, and an economist con¬ 
nected with them finds. The author's study is enclosed in 
a larger study (composed of twelve sub-studies) which tends 
19 
to favor steel. Eckstein and Fromm tend to indict steel 
somewhat in agreement with Gardiner Means and the Report of 
the 1957-58 Congressional Hearings. The Eckstein and Fromm 
study was connected with the 1959 Congressional study by 
■ 
the Joint Economic Committee on Employment, Growth, and 
Price Levels, and that set of Hearings and studies found 
steel to be one important cause of the postwar inflation, 
along with cause by inflation of service prices, and in- 
20 
stability of output in the economy. The 15th American 
Assembly found that both wages and prices were important in 
causing inflation in the postwar period. The demand factor 
was also present in the period. 
Few sources thus give one reason for the postwar in¬ 
flation, but it is apparent that several of them feel steel 
19 
Ibid. The study was directed by Professor Liver- 
nash of Harvard University, and several people from Govern¬ 
ment, business, and universities participated; see the 
preface of the study. 
20 
Full reference in final bibliography. 
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is definitely a contributing factor. It would be expected 
that the union would find the companies at fault, and not 
itself. It would also be expected that the companies would 
find anyone and everyone but themselves at fault. And it 
would be expected that the economist connected (only through 
publication) with the company (United States Steel) would 
find that the company argument was strong, or else he would 
not have a commission. Hence the validity of these arguments 
will not be given as much weight as that of Government or 
independent economist findings. This has its problems 
too, for economists sometimes tend to favor one side before 
making a study. Backman is in favor of the companies, and 
Livernash, who directed the Collective Bargaining study, 
may have some leanings in that direction. Means seems to 
be against the industry. 
It seems that steel has reason to be accused of 
causing inflation, along with the union, and other sectors 
such as services, and other companies and unions which played 
a part. But causing inflation is definitely not in the 
public interest, and some of the findings leave a heavy 
burden of proof on the industry that if left alone to 
do as it pleases, it will act within the public interest. 
'/ 
The results which have been seen must be viewed in light of 
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the intense scrutiny which the industry has undergone. 
What might have happened without such scrutiny can only 
be left to the imagination. 
CHAPTER V 
THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
General Considerations 
The purpose of this thesis is to promote understanding. 
This has to do with the economy, the steel industry, the public 
interest, social control of business, the steel union, and 
the part that these play in the total American system. 
Obviously no single work can accomplish such an objective 
fully, but as the late President John F. Kennedy once said, 
quoting from an ancient proverb, one must take the many in¬ 
dividual steps to complete a thousand mile journey. The 
case of steel is indeed such a journey, and many steps have 
been taken in the past, but many more will be taken in the 
future. 
The steel industry presents a challenge to the American 
people, not only as an individual problem, but as a repre¬ 
sentative of a larger problem of economic concentration and 
its place in society, its power and its advantages or dis¬ 
advantages. There are many related problems, such as 
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automation, growth of unionism as a political and economic 
force, the questions and problems arising from economic 
freedom, the relation between forces in our society and the 
objectives of the society as a system, and, of course, the 
many problems involved in the frameworks of these larger 
problems. This chapter represents an attempt by the writer 
to set forth some views on these matters based on the 
findings of the study and the framework set out in the first 
two chapters of the thesis. 
When focusing on a specific problem, such as an in¬ 
crease in the price of steel products at a given time, one 
may be prone to lose perspective in terms of long range 
processes. This is even more likely when the problem is 
highly controversial and difficult to grasp because of un¬ 
certain standards against which to evaluate rapidly proceeding 
events of great import in the long run. 
In the American system of Democracy, free enterprise, 
representative government, and partisan politics as well as 
bi-partisan Constitutional objectives and guidance, there 
must necessarily be many conflicts. The multiple objectives 
of our system must be seen in relation to the multiple ob¬ 
jectives of its parts, from the major institutional components 
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of our society to the millions of individuals within it. 
This must take place without full understanding of 
these systems, for man does not fully understand any of 
them, legal, economic, or human. The probability of uni¬ 
versal understanding at present is low. Perhaps this is both 
an advantage and a disadvantage in that it presents a chal¬ 
lenge to the capabilities of all these systems, while in 
many cases leading to complacency over the wondrous func¬ 
tioning of the incomprehensible systems such as the economic 
system. "Thus far they have worked! Why bother?" might be 
one way to state the feeling of complacency. 
The cold reality of the situation is that it is easy 
to become involved in one's own problems to the point where 
there is little time for other matters, even if the challenge 
and desire are present. The limitations of the finite mind 
are such that no one can make decisions for everyone, though 
someone gets the job. 
The assassination of the late President John Kennedy 
points to the need for more complete understanding of one 
system, the human system. Such tragedies are part of life, 
possibly unavoidable and unpredictable at present, but no 
one would ever know whether such events are irrevocable 
through complacency^ Man would never have discovered America 
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with complacency. 
There is no doubt that the systems continue, but sane 
systems such as the orbital patterns of the planets may 
never be changed, while sane others such as the economic 
system may be changed; ours is not the only economic system, 
nor is it the first or last. 
The interplay of forces within our society leads to 
conflicts which challenge complacency somewhat. These con¬ 
flicts lead to debate in terms of interests and objectives, 
then to decisions and implementation of the decisions, which 
may be to modify the existing systems or the relationships 
existing between the parts of the total system. This is 
the beauty of the American way of life. Though it has 
moments of heartache, hatred, confusion and despair, the 
challenges of time and history which constantly manifest 
themselves in concrete events lead to critical intelligence 
and evaluation of the progress of mankind on a series of 
paths, in terms of human values and objectives. 
This will not change as long as the strength of the 
human character does not ebb. Our citizens did not fight 
so long in time of war to have this all die. When the 
<±>jectives of one group are in conflict with those of all 
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roen, it is time for a change. 
The change which confronts the American people in the 
problem in this thesis will obviously be slow; the parties 
are part of the total system, they are powerful, have 
interests, and work to implement those interests. But the 
change will ccxne, just as the Sherman Act of 1890 came when 
society would no longer contend with monopoly power. The 
magnitude of the change is not certain but its inevitability 
is certain. The foundation is under construction now in 
Congressional Hearings and factfinding, and in Executive de¬ 
partments of many types. Conflict and forces are present, 
and the debate in terms of interests, values, and objectives 
of the system is in progress. 
Man makes many of his own problems which he must 
solve or live with if they can not be solved. The steel in¬ 
dustry must resolve itself to the consequences of its actions. 
The damage already done, no matter what the extent, perhaps 
can never be restored. But this damage must be seen as 
minor compared to the gains derived from the learning process 
of men through experience, and the eventual nature of the 
resultant system. Democracy of sustained nature is new to 
this world; it was a long time coming, and perhaps man has 
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learned enough to sustain it. Carthage had its Roman Empire, 
and today we have our Russian based Communist Empire in 
opposition to Democracy. 
Now it is possible to see the magnitude of some of 
the problems which confront us. Is steel such a problem? 
Same would argue the point, but few historians would be in 
that group. Steel is a single representative. Not only 
is that the case, but many, if not all of our problems, 
can be analyzed in terms of a general framework of opposing 
forces interacting with each other either directly or through 
intermediaries. Take Freudian analysis, with the interplay 
of the id and the superego through the ego; the interaction 
of Russia and the United States, or more generally, freedom 
and captivity or self-determination and state determination 
through science and values; or steel and the public through 
government. VJhile the examples are divergent, there are 
basic patterns which can be perceived, that shape the destiny 
of man. 
If steel is one problem, there are a thousand others 
of the same basic nature. They are all related, for they 
must all be decided within the framework of our values and 
objectives. 
-79- 
It is possible to understand now the ways in which 
the problems of society become controlled, and what J. M. 
Clark meant when he said that social control of business 
comes not only through Federal action. It is not possible 
to fool all of the people all of the time, as President 
Lincoln once said. The problems are essentially timeless 
because of the nature of the people who have problems. 
Though they learn through the years, it may be that basic 
elements of human nature do not change; personality and 
intellect are separate parts of the person, physical and 
social environment are separate parts of environment, and 
together these four elements lead to behavior. This is why 
we must say that perhaps man has learned enough to sustain 
Democracy. 
The Steel Industry 
The specific incident of April, 1962 brought to light 
the forces at work in society, and the forces of the steel 
industry were deemed to be against the public interest. Now 
it is possible to understand what President Kennedy meant 
when he said that this country was asking its people to 
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sacrifice, and that four men had died in Viet Nam. Although 
it is political, it is something to think about. Man does 
not have the historical justification to avoid thinking 
about it. 
In light of the economic sections of this thesis, the 
author does not feel these words to be too harsh. The facts 
pile up in volume after volume, and many people are convinced 
that the steel industry is not acting in the public interest. 
One might infer that perhaps things are different now, but 
the last price increase came in 1963 after an attempt in 
1962, all after a series of increases in a six year period 
from 1953 to 1959 which amounted to a 40 to 50 per cent in¬ 
crease in the price of steel. Perhaps labor and other 
factors were responsible, but in 1962 labor restrained 
itself, where steel did not. 
Whether the 1962 price increase would have started a 
new wage-price spiral is uncertain, but certainly it would 
not have helped avoid one. The Kennedy Administration had 
been committed to certain objectives, including price 
stability and economic growth. The steel price increase 
would perhaps have hindered these objectives, which are im¬ 
portant in our society at the present time when we are 
/ 
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competing for survival with our adversaries, when unemploy¬ 
ment hovers near six percent of the work force, and generally 
when the government needs support rather than opposition in 
the form the industry posed. A line must be drawn somewhere 
on what is partisan and what is not. 
The specific effects of the price increase should 
not even assume major proportions in this analysis. The in¬ 
dustry has made so many problems for itself and the country 
through its past history frcm the days of Judge Gary to the 
present that people have a right to get some action to pre¬ 
vent the industry from creating turmoil when it is unneeded. 
Surely the position of the Kennedy Administration would have 
suffered in relation to business and labor, and perhaps the 
general public, if nothing had been done; President Kennedy 
said this himself. The matter is not minor. 
The industry had moved so far ahead in the period 
from 1953 to 1958 that United States Steel would have broken 
even at close to 30% of capacity in that year, after the final 
price increase in the series. It is difficult to see why the 
steel industry should deserve to maintain such high levels 
of profit. If labor costs had cut the profit margin some¬ 
what perhaps this is good for the margin was high in 1958. 
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Gar dner's breakeven analysis. Means' analysis, Eckstein and 
Fromm's analysis, the 1957-58 Hearings, and seme of the other 
Hearings all tend to support the general thesis that steel 
is simply too powerful, and its prices simply too high. 
These sources carry a good deal of weight, for the 
companies and their economist can be expected to defend the 
company side. Only one other major study of any scope sub¬ 
stantially supports the arguments of the industry, and this 
was prepared under a Republican Administration and directed 
by conservative economist E. R. Livernash. The relative im¬ 
portance of these studies is difficult to judge. 
Other factors relate here, such as the import-export 
problem in steel, and its competitive position in terms of 
other materials. The balance of payments problem and the 
possible effect steel may have had on it are other factors. 
There is little evidence on this point, save one finding 
of the 1959 Hearings on Employment, Growth, and Price Levels 
that tends to minimize the effects of the competitive position 
of steel on balance of payments (see staff report summary 
1 
in first part of report). 
■^1959 Hearings; full reference in final bibliography, 
see the first section which presents summaries of chapters 
and findings. 
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One of the problems of steel industry practices is 
the fact that the consumer is not allowed to share in the 
gains of efficiency and technology. This should be one of 
the primary aims of society. Means points out that as the 
nature of the economic system in this country changed, the 
problem of legitimacy arose, and the traditional wisdom of 
profit maximization does not fulfill social objectives. The 
companies recognize that; executives state they seek not 
maximum profits in the short or long run, but rather seek 
reasonable profits. Other executives point out that they 
must exercise responsibility in pricing. 
When a firm is earning more on investment than the 
cost of capital in the market, the public interest can be 
damaged in four ways, some of which have not been discussed 
here. Means points out that the suppliers of capital are 
earning a high return on their investments as a result of 
market power rather than risk; also high prices reduce use 
of the product in favor of substitutes; thirdly, increased 
return will reduce capital expenditures, since return must 
be higher before investment will be undertaken; and finally, 
the high profits will leave an inviting target for labor to 
2 
seek. 
^Gardiner Means, Pricing Power and the Public Interest 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 158-60. 
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Means also details at length a plan for beginning 
to bring the steel industry into line with the public in¬ 
terest, so that normal activities of industry officials and 
3 
firms will not stray from the bounds of the public interest. 
Basically the plan involves defining the nature of the 
economic operation in the steel industry, which he calls 
Administrative Competition. It is characterized by ad¬ 
ministered prices, the flow principle of production, and pro¬ 
motion. The flow principle refers to equating production 
and demand at an inflexible price. 
Means believes that the two alternative creeds open 
to the corporation are unsatisfactory (profit or social 
responsibility), and devotes the remainder of his study to a 
third alternative, based on new bonus plans for economic 
performance rather than profits. He states that most of the 
power the executives seek is not tied to profits; only the 
bonus is. He also proposes an Economic Performance Act, 
based on the logic of the Collective Enterprise which is 
engaged in Administrative Competition. The act would in¬ 
clude special tax rates if return approximates cost of 
capital; perhaps only 100 firms would be under the act due 
3Ibid., pp. 163-321. 
-85- 
4 
to their characteristics. 
Other approaches to the problem are few in number. 
One possibility is to do nothing in the hope that steel will 
pull itself into line with the public interest. This has 
not had results in the past which tend to offer support for 
the approach. 
A second approach is antitrust legislation and Supreme 
Court decisions on individual cases. This approach is not 
the best but is part of the present approach. It is not 
very effective in specific instances because cases may take 
up to ten years to completely finish once started, and the 
cost can run to half of a million dollars or more. The 
approach is not generally effective over the entire area, 
due to the specific nature of each case. Others continue 
with their practices until discovered. Even the firms under 
trial may continue with their actions till convicted. 
The nature of the existing antitrust legislation is 
also not conducive to effectiveness due to the poor wording, 
vagueness, and scope of the legislation. And the membership 
of the Supreme Court at any given time may determine the 
4 
Only certain types of firms would be permitted to enter 
into this arrangement; some would be compelled, while others 
might have to prove, their nature was such that they fit the 
classification. 
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types of decisions handed down, which is another factor 
determining antitrust effectiveness, and one which hindered 
effectiveness for some time until the mid-'thirties. 
One phase of the present approach to social control 
is Presidential power which has been exercised at various 
times. In relation to the steel industry, past instances 
/ 
of Presidential power have come in 1952 and 1962. In 1952 
President Truman attempted to seize the industry after at¬ 
tempts at settlement of negotiations. In 1962 President 
Kennedy attempted to bring pressures to bear on the steel 
industry from all quarters of the Government as well as 
public opinion. There were also economic threats to companies 
that increased prices for the Government buys a good deal of 
steel. 
Even though the usually considered methods of social 
control are varied, they are dependent upon public policy 
of some sort toward the power of concentrated industries. 
Public policy over long term periods depends upon public 
knowledge and understanding of unionism, concentration, and 
Government, though this understanding need not be completely 
detailed. The probability of such complete knowledge is 
not high, but the probability of understanding on the part 
of all people of the effects of concentration and wage-price 
-87- 
spirals is high, for many of our citizens have lived with 
these problems. 
One of the biggest factors which does not hold in 
the favor of the industry in this case is that there seems 
to be a conscious attempt to avoid working in the public in¬ 
terest, which shows up in actions and characteristics, while 
generous lip-service and propaganda of various sorts emanates 
from officials and public relations departments. Some of 
this material has been examined in connection with this 
study, and is extremely narrow in point of view — the in¬ 
dustry point of view. 
In addition, the ethical connotations of the 1962 
incident may be questionable for it seemed that the industry 
merely sat back and let the Government and the union commit 
5 
themselves, and then turned around to increase prices. The 
major steel industry efforts toward working in the public in¬ 
terest seem to be verbal, and the concrete actions of the 
industry, such as the increase in prices and profits during 
the 1953-58 period, and the odd methods and arrangements of 
5 
Grant McConnell, Steel and the Presidency, 1962 (New 
York: Norton, 1963), contains an interesting speculative 
discussion, though the author claims it is based upon 
conversations with those who were close to the actions of 
the time. 
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competition among American steel firms seem to point to the 
need for still more Government inquiries and intervention, 
still more public opinion, and other attempts at social con 
trol. 
It is useless to recount all of the thesis in the 
interpretation of the findings because the many individual 
problems which have been discussed (productivity, costs, 
depreciation) could be related at length without gain in 
clarity and achievement. The important thing is to recog¬ 
nize the many problem areas for future study and discussion 
as history progresses. It is believed that this has been 
accomplished. 
Summary of Thesis 
The public interest is many-faceted and represents 
not only individuals but also systems which are part of the 
total American system. It deals with the relationships 
existing between these parts as well as with them in¬ 
dividually. It is concerned with values and objectives of 
1 / , 
the system which are multiple m nature. 
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The need for social control of business or labor 
flows from the nature of the American way of life, and these 
specific parts of the total system are representatives 
rather than isolated cases, i.e., society must control not 
only business but all its parts in some manner. The nature 
of the corporation in modern days of concentration leads to 
power which may be used for good or evil. To trust the use 
of this power to the social responsibility of key individuals 
is laudable, but the steel industry has not yet proved 
itself worthy of this trust. The position of the union in 
the same matter is such that further study is warranted be¬ 
fore drastic measures are taken, but labor in steel may have 
played an important part in the problems of the country with 
the industry. 
The specific problems of the industry need more 
evaluation. While it does not appear that a great deal of 
weight can be placed upon the arguments of the steel companies, 
the problems of depreciation and productivity should receive 
attention as areas where the industry can use help in solving 
its problems. The areas of costs, prices, and profits need 
more work in order for a more thorough analysis of legitimacy 
of the industry. The competitive system of the steel firms 
needs evaluation and decision for public policy purposes of 
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a broad nature; the steel industry is a representative, 
although the practices of the industry may be more important 
or widespread than those of other industries. 
The exact relation of the steel industry to the entire 
economy is debatable, though without question the industry 
can have tremendous impacts on the economy? this is one area 
of the public interest. Many of these problems will have to 
be solved before the people can rest assured that the in¬ 
dustry acts in the public interest. The means of dealing 
with the industry are not as effective as would be desirable, 
and new methods are needed. 
The characteristics of the steel industry certainly 
do not lend an air of social responsibility and action to 
the industry or the officials who run it. The past behavior 
of these men leaves an indelible mark on the history of the 
free enterprise system. 
Specifically, while wages may help to cause infla¬ 
tion through industry supply curves and wage income, prices 
and profits may also function in similar manner. There is 
evidence to support these contentions. The steel industry 
contributed to the newer push types of inflation during the 
1955-58 period. Whether these forces were always at work is 
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not certain, but if not scrutinized they may very well con¬ 
tinue to be detrimental to society. 
The market power of the steel industry is great and 
may need alteration. It is believed that this is already in 
progress though the process is slow. 
In the labor-management area the parties have taken 
steps to reconcile differences through peaceful means, and 
this may eliminate some problems though they should still 
be watched; labor and management together can do as much 
damage as they can do separately with the public paying the 
bills. 
The challenge of economic improvement and outside 
competition will be another problem the industry must face. 
While industry must face many problems, it has been shown 
that responsibility rests upon all men to work for a better 
tomorrow. 
The relation of the steel industry to the economy 
points out that problems which occur are many faceted, and 
have many causes; inflation is one problem and recession 
and growth present others. In order for these problems to 
be solved in the most efficient manner, it is necessary that 
the forces in society be turned to work for society instead 
of against it. The steel industry has not been helpful in 
-92- 
past years. 
The problem lies in the fact that solutions have not 
been reached for the methods of turning these forces to work 
for America, for the steel industry and the public interest. 
While Classical competition models do not fit the steel 
administrative competition characteristics, no standards 
exist against which to judge the performance of the firms 
and officials. Social responsibility doctrines may not ful¬ 
fill the requirements. 
The above problems represent the meaning of the 
crisis in steel, April 1962. 
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